Recent trends in extraterritorial jurisdiction — The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its implications on sovereignty by Fekete, Balázs
 1216-2574 / USD 20.00 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
© 2008 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 49, No 4, pp. 409–440 (2008) 
DOI: 10.1556/AJur.49.2008.4.3 
 
 
BALÁZS FEKETE* 
 
Recent Trends in Extraterritorial Jurisdiction – 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its Implications on 
Sovereignty 
 
 
Abstract. This paper endeavors to analyze the current U.S. practice on the field of extraterritorial 
application of corporate governance law. As it is widely known, sovereignty is one of basic 
tenets of public international law, and its relevance is considerably debated in our age. 
Therefore, the main question of the paper is whether this qualitatively new U.S. practice on the 
field of extraterritoriality can contribute any insight for the better comprehension of the 
transformation of sovereignty. So, it will basically compare the lessons stemming from the 
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to the classical concept of sovereignty.  
 In its first part the paper briefly introduces the reader into the basic notions of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. In doing so, it analyzes some theoretical problems, the former U.S. antitrust law 
practice and the European approach. The second part of the paper deals with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act as an emblematic and very actual example of corporate governance law having 
extraterritorial reach. This part discusses the major provisions of the act in detail as well as 
examines the different arguments justifying or criticizing it. In the last part the paper tries to 
reflect the results of the earlier inquires to different dimensions of sovereignty. Through three 
different prisms–Legislatio, Legitimatio and Subordinatio–the paper compares each aspect of 
sovereignty to the lessons flowing from the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in order to get 
relevant insights concerning the transformation of sovereignty. 
 In conclusion, the paper argues that the classical 19th century approach of sovereignty is 
outdated because of the transformation of the global economic and political context. But, 
sovereignty, as a legal basis and legitimizing factor is still in play if the question is the protection 
of fundamental national interests. As it exactly happened in the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
which intends to protect a pillar–the confidence in corporate governance–of the basic structure 
of U.S. free market system. 
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 “But it does suggest that current fashionable suggestions 
 that State sovereignty is a thing of the past  
are to be understood with some cautions and perhaps some qualification” 
Sir Robert Jennings 
 
 
I. Jurisdiction and extraterritoriality–A general introduction 
 
1. Jurisdiction, from theoretical perspectives 
 
Law, since it is a human product, is necessary dependent upon time and 
circumstances. Its spatial, temporal and material boundaries are designated by 
the legislator itself and the practice of the community of states in the form of 
international customary law. The legislator can define the material, territorial, 
personal and temporal scope of a given legal rule, while international customary 
law regulates the collision of different states’ legal spheres. Thus, the limits of 
a state’s competences stem from both its own decision and the practice of the 
international community of states.  
 
1.1. The concept of jurisdiction  
 
The birth of the doctrine of jurisdiction is a necessary corollary of both the 
formation of the modern international political system and the emergence of 
modern state.1 The premise of states’ sovereign equality, as a basic principle 
of the Westphalian system of international relations rendered necessary the 
elaboration of such rules of international law which are able to regulate the 
relationship among the colliding competences of states. If no state can subor-
dinate other states to its will, since they are equal in a legal sense, international 
law regulating interstate relations needs such rules which can solve the conflicts 
in case of collision of legal rules of different states. Therefore, the emergence 
of the doctrine of jurisdiction was inevitable during the first centuries of legal 
modernity. 
 In the view of F. A. Mann, who elaborated a comprehensive theory of 
international jurisdiction, the concept of jurisdiction in international law 
consists of five constitutive elements. First of all, it is related to activities of a 
state, however it has nothing to do with the internal competences of state 
  
 1 Cf. Weber, M.: Államszociológiai töredék [A Fragment of the Sociology of the 
State]. In: Takács P. (ed.): Államelmélet [State Theory]. Budapest, 2003. 48–70. 
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organs based on municipal law.2 Secondly, jurisdiction is about a state’s right 
to exercise certain of its powers.3 Thirdly, a state’s right to exercise jurisdiction 
is exclusively determined by public international law.4 So, states cannot 
unilaterally determine the scope of their jurisdiction, it is delimited by public 
international law. Fourthly, jurisdiction is focused on states’ right of regulation.5 
Lastly, jurisdiction in international law has only relevance in those cases which 
are about matters not exclusively of domestic concern.6 He concludes that 
jurisdiction “is concerned with what has been described as one of the funda-
mental functions of public international law, viz. the function of regulating and 
delimiting respective competences of States.”7 
 It is common ground in doctrine that jurisdiction comprised of the afore-
mentioned five constituting components has three different aspects. One can 
use the expression of jurisdiction to elaborate on the opportunities of states 
how to perform acts in the territory of other states (executive jurisdiction), to 
explain the competences of courts to deal with cases in which a foreign factor 
is present (judicial jurisdiction), and to analyze the power of states to make 
binding laws to cases involving foreign elements (legislative jurisdiction).8  
 
1.2. The origins of the doctrine of jurisdiction, territoriality 
 
As a consequence of the predominance of the concept of sovereignty in the 
structure of modern international law a territorial approach of jurisdiction 
emerged during modernity. This territorial approach was in perfect conformity 
with the needs of modern international law which regarded the world as a 
community of sovereign states. All these sovereign states formed complete 
units of legal systems regulating legal relationships over their territory, as 
Bodin described it in his fundamental work.9  
  
 2 Mann, F. A.: The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law. Recueil des Cours, 
1964, I. 9. 
 3 Ibid. 9. 
 4 Ibid. 10. 
 5 Ibid. 13. 
 6 Ibid. 15. 
 7 Ibid. 
 8 Shaw, M. N.: International Law. Cambridge, 2003. 576–578.; Akehurst, M.: Juris-
diction in International Law. British Yearbook of International Law 43 (1972–73) 177; 
Lowe, V.: Jurisdiction. In: Evans, M. (ed.): International Law. Oxford, 2003. 329. 
 9 Cf. Bodin, J.: Les six livres de la république. Paris, 1526. 
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 U. Huber in his work published in 168410 laid down the foundations of 
the territorial theory of jurisdiction. In his axioms he announced that laws of 
sovereign authorities have only force within the boundaries of its state, and the 
exercise of sovereign authority should not prejudice that kind of power of 
other states.11 These axioms gradually became the guiding principles of the 
territorial conception of jurisdiction. Joseph Story only reformulated them in a 
more modern wording when he affirmed that “every nation possesses an 
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory” and “no State 
can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property out of its own territory or bind 
persons not residents there” except so far as regards its own citizens.12 Story’s 
general maxims were universally accepted in the community of international 
lawyers prior to World War I. Therefore, they dominated the doctori communis 
opinio about the scope of jurisdiction.13 
 However, the transformation of the structure of world economy, precisely 
both the strengthening of economic interdependence and the growing role of 
multinational enterprises, has been starting to progressively challenge this 
approach following the end of World War II. Due to the far-reaching conse-
quences of the alteration of the world economic context the leading states of 
the world economy made severe attempts to regulate more-and-more that 
economic conduct which took place outside of their territories, but neverthe-
less affected their domestic market. 
 
1.3. Beyond the territorial principle and legislative jurisdiction 
 
This profoundly, or dramatically, altered economic environment induced the 
rethinking of the whole concept of jurisdiction which was born in a considerably 
different socio-economic context. Territoriality did not seem to be able to offer 
adequate answers for the novel problems of the post World War II era anymore. 
It became clear for the scholars’ community that this traditional concept should 
be exceeded. It was also obvious that the whole paradigm needed rethinking, 
not only some parts of the territorial approach. 
  
 10 The title of this work: De conflictu legum diversarum in diversis imperiis. 
 11 Mann: op. cit. 26. 
 12 Mann: op. cit. 28. 
 13 However, in the Lotus-case, in 1927, the PCIJ argued that territoriality is not an 
absolute principle of international law and it does not coincide with territorial sovereignty. 
[PCIJ, Lotus case, No. 9. (France/Turkey), judgment of 7 September 1927, Permanent 
Court International Justice Report. Series A. Nr. 10, 20.] With this, the case-law opened 
the theoretical possibility to accept other approaches than strict territoriality.  
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 Mann suggested that international law concerning legislative jurisdiction 
should liberate itself from the chains of the traditional territorial approach and 
the time came for the elaboration of a qualitatively new approach.14 Therefore, 
he proposed a change of point of view at the beginning of the 60’s. He suggested 
that international lawyers should not ask anymore whether certain facts can be 
subject to the legislation of a state, but whether the relevant facts of a case 
belong to a given jurisdiction.15 Therefore, in his view, problems of jurisdiction 
should be approached from the direction of the legislation, so from the aspect of 
a given state, rather than from the direction of the nature of the facts.  
 According to this approach, when deciding on jurisdiction, it must firstly 
be decided whether a given jurisdiction has a ‘close connection’ with the 
relevant facts of the case. The assessment of these facts from the aspect of 
territorial maxims may be of marginal importance. Hence, to claim jurisdiction 
over a given ‘behavior’ a close connection with the facts of the case is needed, 
not a territorial one. This close connection must demonstrate a genuine link, in 
other words a sufficiently strong interest in the case at hand.16 If a state’s 
relation to a certain constellation of facts is “so close, so substantial, so direct, 
so weighty”17 then a state can legitimately, that is, in harmony with international 
law, claim the right of legislation in that respect.  
 In sum, Mann argues that mere political, social, economic or commercial 
interests cannot in themselves establish this close enough connection, since 
any declaration of jurisdiction should be in harmony with basic principles, 
such as non-interference, reciprocity, of international law. One may say that 
Mann proposed to reformulate the theory of jurisdiction on the basis of interest 
instead of the traditional territorial approach which looked to be quite old-
fashioned within the conditions of an emerging global economy.  
 
1.4. The ‘primary effects’ approach 
 
As a further step in the inner development of the doctrine of jurisdiction 
Michael Akehurst suggested some additional refinement with regard to the 
effects doctrine forged out by the case law. In his view it implies certain 
obscurity from a theoretical point of view. As a main problem, Akehurst pointed 
out that the broad interpretation of this approach can easily refer to absolutely 
coincidental facts, remote and slight effects. And, asserting jurisdiction on this 
  
 14 Mann: op. cit. 43.  
 15 Ibid. 44–45. 
 16 Ibid. 46. 
 17 Ibid. 49. 
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basis would have an unfavorable effect on trade relations. It is easy to accept 
that almost all transnational economic activities can have a certain effect on 
markets around the globe. 
 He proposed that the best way to avoid the implications related to a too 
broad interpretation, such as for instance too many states claiming jurisdiction 
in a given case, is to limit jurisdiction to that state where the primary effects 
of the business conduct occurred. In the determination of the primary or 
secondary nature of the ‘effects’ two factors should be taken into account.18 
Firstly, are the effects more direct in a state than in other states? Secondly, are 
the effects occurring in a given state more substantial than in other states? On 
the basis of this ‘primary effects test’ it will be possible to differentiate among 
primary effects which may call for state intervention via its legislation and 
judiciary, and other effects which are too slight and remote to trigger the same 
mechanisms. In conclusion, as argued by Akehurst, this approach makes the 
exercise of jurisdiction possible by those states which have a legitimate interest 
in the given case.19 So, by this development, Mann’s ‘close connection’ require-
ment is realized since this theory links the ‘effects doctrine’ with the legitimate 
interest of states. This approach helps to sufficiently sharpen the focus of the 
‘effects theory’, so that it creates a reasonable framework for asserting juris-
diction over business practices occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of a 
state. 
 
2. Globalized world economy and competition law 
 
The main goal of competition or antitrust law is to help the neutralization of 
those effects which can likely arise from an imperfect competition. Distortion 
of competition can have such outcomes which are unfavorable from the point 
of view of society. Monopolies cause welfare losses by maintaining prices 
above the optimal and blocking market entry for new innovative actors. Unfair 
or restrictive commercial practices also disturb the functioning of the market 
by depriving the consumer of information necessary to make optimal and well-
founded choices, that is, they cause informational asymmetries. Therefore 
market power and market actors are to be necessarily regulated in order to 
improve the work of the market. A smooth run of the market can increase the 
aggregated social welfare as followers of Adam Smith believe and teach it.20  
  
 18 Akehurst: op. cit. 198. 
 19 Ibid. 201. 
 20 Cf. Van Cayseele, P. and Van den Bergh, R.: Antitrust Law. In: Bouckaert, E.–
Geest, G.: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5300book.pdf 
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 The birth of competition law at the end of 19th century was thus an answer 
to regulate those circumstances which disturb the real functioning of the 
market.21 Of course, these early acts mainly intended to regulate the national 
market, that is, the domestic market of a given country. The structural features 
of the world economy prior to World War I and in the interwar period did not 
render it necessary to take into account foreign acts and facts to that degree as 
it is unavoidable today. 
 However, today’s world economy is characterized by new features which 
separate it from the earlier stages. According to a historical approach, following 
the age of mainly land and agriculture based pre-industrial capitalism and the 
industrial, machine and finance based second phase of capitalism–in which the 
Sherman Act was born in 1890–a qualitatively new economic phenomenon has 
come forth in the last decades of the 20th century.  
 This new form of capitalism is now mainly knowledge-based and has a 
global dimension in contrast to the limited spatial diffusion of the earlier 
stages. The distinctiveness of this new economic world order is based on five 
qualitatively new features. Firstly, cross-border transactions are deeper and 
more interconnected than they have ever been. Secondly, resources, goods and 
services are spatially more mobile than they have ever been. Thirdly, multi-
national enterprises play a more significant role in the creation and distribution 
of wealth than they have ever done before. Fourthly, the financial and real 
volatility has increased in a considerable degree due to the dramatically 
increased interdependence. And lastly, the advent of digital environment and 
electronic commerce has completely changed the character of cross-border 
transactions by making them much faster and easier.22  
 Therefore interdependence,23 which has transactional, spatial and informa-
tional dimensions in economic sense,24 is a keyword to understand that 
  
 21 The first anti-trust acts were the following: the Sherman Act of 1890 (US), the Law 
against Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) of 1909 (Germany), 
the Clayton Act of 1914 (US), and the Combines Investigation Act of 1923 (Canada).  
 22 Dunning, J. H.: Global Capitalism at Bay. London, 2001. 13. 
 23 A guiding indicator of economic globalization in the sense of interdependence is 
the trade-to-GDP ratio (in other terms the “trade openness ratio”). Between 1992 and 2005 
this indicator increased by 13 percentage points for the whole OECD. For the details see 
http://titania.sourceoecd.org/pdf//fact2007pdf//03-01-01.pdf. And Cf. Woods, N.: The 
Political Economy of Globalization. In: Woods, N. (ed.): The Political Economy of 
Globalization. London, 2000. 1–3. 
 24 For a detailed and broader discussion of interdependence in international law see: 
Wouters, J.: Perspectives for International Law in the Twenty-First Century: Chaos or 
World Legal Order. Ethical Perspectives 7 (2000) 17–23. 
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economic context in which the problems of extraterritoriality in antitrust cases 
have arisen in the last decades. 
 
3. Extraterritoriality in antitrust cases; general introduction 
 
The very first problems of extraterritoriality in antitrust cases have already 
appeared in the first decade of the 20th century and they continuously crystallized 
during the whole century. So, anti-trust extraterritoriality has a history of more 
than ninety years. The experiences of this period may help to formulate some 
general premises supporting the particular research of the new trends in the 
second part. 
 
3.1. The genesis of the U.S. practice 
 
Thus, in accordance with the classical doctrine of public international law, 
legislative jurisdiction regarding restrictive business practices is subject to 
those limitations which stem from territoriality.25 However, within the conditions 
of a highly interrelated world economy characterized by several dimensions of 
interdependence it is more-and-more difficult to localize such business practices 
which extend beyond a certain scale.26 Generally, business transactions beyond 
and over national boundaries can be realized in a form of complicated patterns 
of conduct implying a longer time period and a transnational, even global 
spatial area.27 So, these practices necessary have a transnational character due 
to the very nature of their economic context, and this transnational nature 
encodes some problems of extraterritoriality from the point of view of legislator. 
 
3.1.1. The prior-Alcoa period, the first antecedents 
U.S. antitrust law is fundamentally based on two legislative acts; on the 
Sherman Act of 1894 and Clayton Act of 1914. While the Sherman Act in its 
first paragraph declared that all anticompetitive business illegal,28 so to say it 
  
 25 For an analysis of alternative legal bases for the application of antitrust law see: 
Basedow, J.: International Antitrust: From Extraterritorial Application to Harmonization. 
Louisiana Law Review 61 (1999–2000) 1039–1042. 
 26 On the question of localization see Mann: op. cit. 36–37. 
 27 Ibid. 
 28 Sherman Act 1§ “every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nation, is declared to be illegal.” Stranger, A.: Analyzing U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction over 
foreign parties after Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. Brigham Young University 
Law Review, 2003. 1456. 
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indicated the general U.S. antitrust attitude, the Clayton Act established a 
detailed procedural framework for antitrust affairs.29 Additionally, the legislator 
announced that their provisions equally apply for domestic and foreign 
business practices by explicitly addressing activities among foreign nations.30 
 Nevertheless, from the birth of the Sherman Act to the first decade of the 
20th century, U.S. courts did not think of applying the Sherman Act for 
business practices occurring outside U.S. territory.31 Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, as a judge of the U.S. Supreme Court, in his opinion in the American 
Banana v. United Fruit Co.32 pointed out that the lawfulness of an act causing 
damage in the U.S. “must be determined wholly by the law of the country 
where the act is done”.33  
 However, this practice based on a restrictive interpretation of the Sherman 
Act radically changed by the judgment in the case of United States v. Am. 
Tobacco Co.34 in 1911. The court held that an agreement between a U.S. and 
a British tobacco syndicate is under the scope of U.S. antitrust law notwith-
standing that the agreement was concluded under British jurisdiction.35 
Moreover, Chief Justice White argued that a specific “rule of reason” imposes 
U.S. antitrust law to foreign cartels if they significantly threaten U.S. commerce.36 
With this judgment the case-law37 confirmed the legislator’s intent concerning 
the extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act.  
  
 29 The Clayton Act concerning the enforcement of antitrust law provided that the U.S. 
government can bring both civil and criminal suits in case of an illegal, anti-competitive 
conduct. Moreover, it mandated private parties to bring suits, and provided treble damages 
for successful complaints. Ibid. 1457. 
 30 Ibid. 1458. 
 31 The U.S. Supreme clearly declared in Rose v. Himely [8 U.S. (Cranch) 241 (1806)] 
that, on the basis of conflict-of-laws rules, U.S. legislation is basically territorial, and 
beyond its borders it can only affect its subjects and citizens. Moreover, in 1812, it forged 
out a presumption that federal law applies only within the U.S. Norton, J. J.: Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Security Laws. The International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 28 (1979) 577. 
 32 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 33 Mehra, S. K.: Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International 
Consensus. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 1999. 204,; Falencki, C. 
A.: Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the Presumption Against Extraterritorialty. The George 
Washington International Law Review 35 (2004) 1219. 
 34 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
 35 Stranger: op. cit. 1458, footnote 24. 
 36 Ibid. Footnote 25. 
 37 Other cases disregarding the principle of territoriality in antitrust matters: Strassheim 
v. Daily [221 U.S. 280 (1911)], U.S. v. Pacific & Arctic Co. [228 U.S. 87 (1913)], and U.S. 
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3.1.2. The “effects doctrine” and the Alcoa judgment 
As we have seen in the prior World War II period, the U.S. courts, following 
some hesitation, consequently applied U.S. antitrust law to anticompetitive 
foreign business practices affecting the domestic market. However, it should 
also be recognized that they did so on the basis of occasional considerations, 
so they did not forge out a coherent doctrine for the justification of their 
practice.  
 The so-called “effects doctrine” was born in the famous Alcoa decision of 
the Second Circuit. Since it was able to offer a solid conceptual framework for 
antitrust litigation having extraterritorial dimensions, it could swiftly replace 
the earlier fragmented practice. In 1945 in the US v. Aluminium Company of 
America and others38 (the Alcoa case) the court had to decide on such economic 
effects which resulted from business practices of foreigners outside of the 
USA. In the given case an agreement among foreign aluminium producing 
companies affected aluminium imports to the United States.39 The Court 
argued that “It is a settled law […] that any State may impose liabilities […] 
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders.”40 
Furthermore, the Court also asserted that the intention to produce effects on the 
territory of United States is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the US. 
And, if this intention is proved, the burden of proof will automatically shift to 
the defendant to prove that his acts have no such effects.41 
 The details of the effects doctrine were elaborated by Judge Learned 
Hand’s opinion in this case. According to him four conditions must be fulfilled 
to assert US laws over those conducts which occurred outside the territory of 
US. First of all, a close connection between the conduct and its effect is 
necessary. Secondly, this effect must be substantial, so it cannot have marginal 
relevance concerning the given market segment. Thirdly, the effects must be 
“direct and foreseeable”; a mere coincidence of facts is not enough to assert 
jurisdiction. Fourthly, the application of this doctrine should be “consistent 
with generally recognized principles of justice”.42 
                                                      
v. Sisal [274 U.S. 268 (1927)]. Common in these cases that the Court chose quite diverse 
legal bases for the justification of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, for example: producing 
detrimental effects, the realization of the conspiracy happened partially in the U.S., or the 
intention of the parties. Norton: op. cit. 577–579.  
 38 148 F. 2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). 
 39 Akehurst: op. cit. 193. 
 40 Quoted by Akehurst, ibid. 
 41 Ibid. 194. 
 42 De Kieffer, D. E.: Effects on US Trade. In: Lacey, J. R. (ed.): Act of State and 
Extraterritorial Reach: Problems of Law and Policy. New Orleans, 1982. 63. 
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3.1.3. Post-Alcoa developments: the Timberlane decision and the FTAIA 
Following the Alcoa-judgment the ‘effects theory’ was applied in many US 
antitrust cases.43 In 1976 the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank 
of America44 substantially improved this approach by amending the traditional 
effects test with the element of comity.45 In the view of the Ninth Circuit the 
“effects test” simply failed to take into account other states’ legitimate interests. 
A so-called “jurisdictional rule of reason”46 should be applied in addition to the 
effects analysis in order to decide whether a U.S. Court has jurisdiction over a 
certain business activity. This “jurisdictional rule of reason” is composed of 
several factors which should be assessed to assert jurisdiction. Chief amongst 
these factors are: (i) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, (ii) the 
extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to comply, (iii) the 
extent to which there is an explicit purpose to harm or affect American 
commerce, and (iv) the relative importance of the given conduct within the 
U.S. as compared with conduct abroad.47 So, by adding the element of comity 
to the “effects test” the Ninth Circuit considerably blunted its edge and there-
fore it contributed to the consolidation of the quite upheaval international 
atmosphere.48 
 The Free Trade and Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 (FTAIA) could 
also be regarded as a qualitatively new development in the story of “effects 
test”. This procedural statute amending the Sherman Act attempted to unify 
those divergent “effects tests” which were elaborated in the judgments of 
different courts.49 The FTAIA requires the Sherman Act to apply to all conduct 
related to imports, and it can also be applied in those cases where there is a 
direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce or U.S. 
exports and this effect “gives rise to a claim under the Sherman Act”.50  
  
 43 The US courts referred to this doctrine in US v. Timken Roller Bearing Co. [83 F. 
Supp. 284 (1951)], US v. General Electric Co. [82 F. Supp. 753 (1953)], US. v. The Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Centre [Trade Cases 77, 414. (1963)] and Hazeltine 
Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp. [239 F. Supp 51, 78 (1969)]. Cf. Akehurst: op. cit. 194. 
 44 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)  
 45 About the concept of comity and its role in antitrust litigation see Mehra: op. cit. 
203–211.  
 46 Ibid. 205. 
 47 Quoted by Mehra, ibid. 
 48 For critics of this approach on the basis that assessing the interests of states is not 
part of the judicial function see: Durack, P.: Australia: Conflicts and Comity. In: Act of 
State and Extraterritorial Reach… op. cit. 48–49. 
 49 Cf. Stranger: op. cit. 1459–1460.  
 50 Ibid. 1461. 
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 However, the FTAIA was not as successful as initially hoped by the legislator. 
Because of the ambiguous expression of “gives rise to a claim” divergent 
interpretations began to develop around the question who precisely can have 
standing before a U.S. court in an antitrust case. In case if the plaintiff is a U.S. 
company no problems arise since it can raise the claim without difficulties.51 
Conversely, if the given case is about damages occurring outside the U.S. 
market, which may affect the U.S. market, as a result of non-U.S. companies’ 
act, the interpretation of the “gives rise to a claim” clause is more problematic. 
U.S. courts tried to solve this question in three different and divergent ways. 
The Fifth Circuit held in Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HerreMac Vof52 
case that this clause only allows for plaintiffs who are injured in connection 
with the effect, so it interpreted it very narrowly.53 The Second Circuit in 
Kruman v. Christie’s International54 chose a different approach by declaring 
that on the basis of this clause it is possible to grant jurisdiction if the plaintiff 
can show evidence of a hypothetical claim under U.S. laws.55 Finally, the D.C. 
Circuit also created its own interpretation. As it was elaborated in Empagran 
S.A. v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd56 foreign plaintiffs can have standing if they bring 
a suit alongside those U.S. plaintiffs who had suffered damages in the U.S.57 
 
3.2. The European approach 
 
The European Union and the EU member states, on a political and a legislative 
level, produced quite a hostile reaction regarding the extraterritorial reach of 
U.S. antitrust law. The United Kingdom, as for instance, adopted the U.K. 
Protection Trading Interests Act in 1980 in order to outweigh the negative con-
sequences flowing from the U.S. practice. Moreover, in the 90’s the EU in 
many press releases questioned the legality of the extraterritorial application of 
the Helms-Burton58 and D’Amato59 acts and other laws60 which established 
  
 51 Ibid. 1464. 
 52 241 F. 3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 53 For details see: Stranger: op. cit. 1465–1466. 
 54 284 F. 3d 384 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
 55 For details see: Stranger: op. cit. 1466–1468. 
 56 315 F. 3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 57 Stranger: op. cit. 1470. 
 58 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.; for a detailed discussion of 
the act from the point of view of the entertprises see: Wallace, C. D.: The Multinational 
Enterprise and Legal Control. The Hague–London–New York, 2002. 613–625. 
 59 Iran and Lybia Sanctions Act of 1996. 
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unilateral sanctions against the so-called “rouge” states between 1993 and 1996. 
Obviously these acts considerably affected other nations’ trade and commerce 
by unilaterally blocking commerce and business participation in the sanctioned 
countries. The result of long-lasting negotiations was a Transatlantic Cooperation 
Agreement in 1998. Thereby the U.S. government provided a waiver under 
these acts for the European Union in exchange for suspending the WTO 
proceedings against these acts initiated by the European Communities.61 
 From the earlier it may seem that the EU and its member states have been 
quite reluctant towards the extraterritorial application of laws, and they have 
approached this problem from the direction of solid territoriality. However, the 
analysis of some ECJ and Commission decisions may suggest a slightly shaded 
conclusion. During the 60’s and 70’s the Commission and the Court of Justice 
have already applied the effects doctrine to claim jurisdiction over certain 
business conducts. In cases related to distributorship agreements, Martens and 
Streat v. Bendix (1964) and Béguelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import Export 
(1971)62 or market-access agreements, Grossfillex v. Fillistorff (1964), the 
European Commission or the ECJ partially applied “effects doctrine”.63  
 It is also very intriguing that the Advocate Generals in Imperial Chem. 
Indus. v. Commission64 and Ahlström v. Commission65 explicitly referred to the 
“effects test” by using the same criteria–substantial, direct and foreseeable–as 
used in the U.S.66 But, the ECJ by applying different legal constructions avoided 
the explicit application of the “effect test” in order to establish its juris-
diction. Finally, in 1999 in Gencor v. Commission67 the ECJ declared that it 
has jurisdiction if the conduct, in this case a merger, can have an immediate 
and substantial effect on the EC market. In this case the ECJ acknowledged 
that the application of the “effects test” is not contrary to international law.68 
Thus, while on a political level the countries of the EU and the EU in itself has 
                                                      
 60 Between 1993 and 1996 61 laws and other administrative actions were adopted, which 
authorized unilateral economic sanctions against 35 countries. For a detailed list see: Layton, 
A.–Parry, A. M.: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: European Responses. Huston Journal of 
International Law, 30 (2004) 315; footnote 22. 
 61 For a detailed discussion of the whole process see ibid. 315–318. 
 62 Case C-22/71 Béguelin Import v G.L. Import Export (Rec. 1971, 949). 
 63 Akehurst: op. cit. 197. 
 64 Case C-48/69 Imperial Chem. Indus. v Commission [1972] European Court Reports, 
619. 
 65 Case C-89/85 Ahlström v Commission [1988] European Court Reports, 5193. 
 66 Layton–Parry: op. cit. 318–320. 
 67 Case T-102/96 Gencor Ltd. v Commission [1999] European Court Reports, II-753. 
 68 Layton–Parry: op. cit. 322. 
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a quite conservative standpoint concerning the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. laws, the practice of the ECJ seems to be quite similar to the U.S. 
practice. 
 
 
II. Recent developments on the field of corporate governance law 
 
1. Changing scope: from behavior of market actors to their governance 
 techniques 
 
Following the earlier brief theoretical-historical overview the paper wishes to 
turn to recent tendencies. As a starting point of this analysis it might be 
worthwhile recognizing a qualitatively new trend underlying the development 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction issues. As we have seen in the first part, from the 
50’s to the 80’s the problems of extraterritoriality mostly flowed from such 
conducts of economic actors which may affect the domestic market. However, 
following the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 200369 the focus of questions 
concerning extraterritoriality suddenly shifted to the area of corporate 
governance. So, while in the first four decades of the history of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction problems were mainly arising from the conduct of economic actors, 
their restrictive practices which may affect the domestic market, nowadays the 
main problem of legislation having extraterritorial reach is how these economic 
operators direct their businesses. So, the whole problem of extraterritoriality 
got a relatively new layer in the last years besides the ‘traditional’ issue of 
transnational restrictive economic practices.70 
  
 69 For the full text of the act see http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf 
 70 Although commentators agree that U.S. securities laws, in principle, cannot be 
extraterritorially applied there are some very limited exceptions under this rule. In. 
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook (403 f. 2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1967) and in Leasco Data Processing 
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell (468 F. 2d 1326 (2nd Cir. 1972) the Second Circuit found that 
sec. 10 (b) (an anti-fraud provision) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can be 
extraterritorially applied. And, the court developed a specific conflict-of-laws rule for the 
extraterritorial application of this section of the act in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone (549 
F. 2d 614 (9th Cir. 1976). For details see Norton, J. J.: op. cit. 584–587 and 590–591. 
Additionally, the judgment in Consolidated Goldfields plc. V. Minorco S.A. (871 F. 2d 252 
(1989) also raised the certain questions about the extraterritoriality of U.S. securities laws. 
Cf. F. A. Mann: The Extremism of American Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 39 (1990) 410–412. Furthermore, this development has 
also some antecedents in certain provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 
This act covered conduct of (i) U.S. companies’ subsidiaries abroad as well as (ii) foreign 
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2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its extraterritorial implications 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacted on July 30, 2002 has opened a new chapter in 
the history of extraterritoriality. According to U.S. commentators it should be 
regarded as the most comprehensive corporate reform legislation since the 
reforms that had been introduced under the presidency of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.71 Both the Securities Act of 1932 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 mainly intended to give concrete answers to the financial crisis of 
1929 from the aspect of corporate and securities affairs. Commentators also 
agree that the decisive impetus behind the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act were the corporate scandals between 2001 and 2002 coined by such 
companies’ names as Enron, World Com Inc., Adelphia Communications Co. 
and so on.72 Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act must be regarded as a clear govern-
mental answer to certain failures and shortcomings of the U.S. corporate system 
and one of its major aims is to restore and preserve investors’ confidence in the 
securities market.73  
 It is more than a commonplace that the U.S. securities market is one of the 
world’s most important marketplaces.74 Foreign companies are traditionally 
actors on these capital markets, therefore extraterritorial problems were implied 
from the very first moment of the birth of the act. 
 
                                                      
companies registered under the Exchange Act. De Kieffer: op. cit. 61–62. But corporate 
governance issues from the aspect of extraterritoriality were impressively and 
comprehensively raised by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 71 Lunt, M. G.: The Extraterritorial Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. Journal of 
Business Law, 2006. 250. President Bush regarded it as “the most far-reaching reforms of 
American business practices” Thompson, J.: The Paradoxical Nature of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act as it Relates to the Practitioner Representing a Multinational Corporation. 
Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 16 (2006) 266. 
 72 Lunt: op. cit. 249.; On the background and the legislative history of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act see Falencki: op. cit. 1212–1214. 
 73 In the words of William Donaldson, former president of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Quoted by Stoltenberg, C.–Lacey, K. A.–George, B. C.–Cuthbert, 
M.: A Comparative Analysis of Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Governance Develop-
ments in the U.S. and European Union. The American Journal of Comparative Law 53 
(2005) 462.; Or, in the words of Congress, as it was formulated in the act’s preamble, 
the aim of the act is “To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.” 
 74 Most of the major transnational companies are registered companies on the U.S. 
securities exchanges. Cf.: http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreignsummary 
2006.pdf 
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2.1. Nexus to extraterritoriality 
 
Concerning the extraterritorial scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, its definition 
of “issuer” has a predominant importance. In its 2 § (a) (1) the act defines 
“issuer” as  
“an issuer (as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), 
the securities of which are registered under section 12 of that Act, or that is 
required to file reports under section 15 (d), or that files or has filed a 
registration statement that has not yet become effective under the Securities 
Act of 1933, and that is has not withdrawn.”75  
 Thus, the decisive factor from the personal scope of the act is either the fact 
that a company’s securities are registered according to the Securities Exchange 
Act or the company is required to send reports to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Therefore, all non-U.S. companies registered on the US. 
securities exchanges and reporting with the SEC are under the scope of the 
act.76 So, all companies whose securities are traded in the U.S. must comply 
with the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Therefore, it is clear that the 
act has an extraterritorial scope from the point of view of those multinational 
enterprises that are registered on U.S. securities exchanges. 
 
2.2. The major provisions of the act 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced numerous new provisions concerning the 
traditional corporate governance structure of U.S. companies. These provisions 
specifically aimed to strengthen the transparency of the companies’ affairs so 
they are answers to a specific problem of the U.S. corporate governance 
model. However, they may be in conflict with foreign corporate governance 
laws due to the explicit extraterritorial nature of the act arising from its 
definition of “issuer”. Thus it is inevitable to get to know them better, in order 
to understand the vehement foreign, mostly European, reactions. 
 The act introduced reform in the following areas of corporate governance.77 
Firstly, it instituted certain reforms regarding the pre-Enron corporate struc-
  
 75 Quoted by Falencki: op. cit. 1222. 
 76 On December 31, 2006 1145 foreign companies were registered. Cf.: http://www. 
sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreignsummary2006.pdf 
 77 On the basis of M. D. Vancea’s categorization, however by restructuring it and 
amending it with new elements Cf. Vancea, M. D.: Exporting U.S. Corporate Governance 
Standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Unilateralism or Cooperation. Duke Law 
Journal 53 (2003) 838–839. 
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tures of U.S. companies by (i) establishing the so-called audit committee, as a 
compulsory requirement for all companies under its scope;78 (ii) expanding 
certain disclosure requirements for principal executive officers;79 (iii) introduc-
ing new certification requirements for CEOs and CFOs;80 (iv) prohibiting loans 
to executives of a company81 and (v) establishing an efficient “whistleblower 
protection” system for employees providing information about the financial 
situation of a company.82 Secondly, it made serious efforts in order to (vi) 
considerably enhance the independence of auditors by dramatically decreasing 
the potential personal and business relationship between audit firms and their 
audit clients.83 Thirdly, from the aspect of administrative regulation it (vii) 
  
 78 Section 301 of the act obliges all publicly registered companies to establish an audit 
committee which is directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight 
of the work of the auditor, a public accounting firm registered by the new regulatory entity 
(PCAOB), employed by the issuer. This committee is composed of independent members 
and members of the board of directors. The other main part of this committee’s work is to 
treat any complaints on accounting, internal controls and auditing matters. Lunt: op. cit. 252. 
 79 Section 409 obliges each issuer to disclose to the public any relevant information 
regarding the financial situation of the company as rapidly as possible. Furthermore, according 
to section 401 every report containing financial statements, mainly the periodic reports, 
should reflect all “material correcting adjustments to […] financial statements” which have 
been identified by an external audit firm. Lunt: op. cit. 254–255. 
 80 Section 302 requires that both the principal executive and financial officer must 
certify in the quarterly and annual reports that they give a fair presentation of the financial 
situation, so to say the statements contained in the report are accurate and complete. 
Additionally, as required by section 906, these periodic reports submitted to the SEC have 
to include a certification prepared by the CEOs and CFOs that the given report fully 
complies with the relevant sections of the Securities Exchange Act. Lunt: op. cit. 251. 
 81 Section 402 prohibits any credits in the form of personal loans to executive officers. 
Lunt: op. cit. 251. 
 82 Section 806 forbids to discharge, suspend, threaten, harass or even discriminate 
against an employee because of the fact that this employee lawfully provided information 
or assisted in an investigation. If the employee can reasonably believe that a conduct 
constitutes a violation of any securities law he cannot be sanctioned due to her/his assistance 
to the public authorities. Lunt: op. cit. 255–256. 
 83 Section 206 forbids audit firms to perform for a company any audit service if any of 
the companies’ principal executive officers has been employed by the given audit firm and 
participated in any capacity in the audit of that company in the one year period preceding 
the actual audit process. Additionally, Section 201 explicitly prohibits auditors to provide 
eight specified non-audit services for the audit clients. Furthermore, section 203 requires 
that audit partners should rotate every five years. O’Neill, T.–Cardi, B.–Chabit, S.: Conflicts 
between French Law and Practice of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. International 
Business Lawyer, April 2003, 62–63. 
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strengthened the sanctions, both civil and criminal, for violations of securities 
law84 and (viii) significantly broadened the prescriptive competences of the 
SEC over companies by delegating a general implementing power to it85 and 
(ix) established a new administrative body, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to register audit companies and set forth compulsory 
standards for the audit profession.86  
 
2.3. Arguments for justification and critics  
 
Obviously, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been a central topic of political, 
business and scholarly disputes since Congress passed it. In these debates one 
can distinguish an armada of arguments concerning the values and the 
disadvantages of the act. In the next part this paper shall try to summarize the 
most important lines of argumentation in order to indicate the worldwide 
reception of the act. 
  
 84 If the principal officers falsely certify a report, or any report contains false state-
ments, they have to face serious fines and/or prison sentences. In case of a “knowingly” 
false certification the penalty may be a fine up to $1 million and/or prison sentence of up to 
10 years. If it was committed “willfully” the penalties imposed are much more serious, a 
fine up to $5 million and/or prison sentence of up to 20 years. Moreover, the act creates a 
new crime for the destruction, alteration or falsification of records in federal investigations 
and the destruction of corporate audit records in its section 802. Ibid.; Vancea: op. cit. 839. 
Footnote 32. 
 85 The act by its section 3 (a) gives a general mandate to the SEC to “promulgate such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors, and in furtherance of this Act.” Until July 30, 2003 the SEC 
adopted 13 sets of rules in various areas, such as for example improving the independence 
of outsider auditors, requiring companies to disclose whether they have a code of ethics for 
the principal officers, or governing standards of conduct for attorneys practicing before the 
SEC. Section 1103 permits SEC to temporally freeze certain payments made to those who 
violated securities law, and due to section 1105 the SEC has an authority to prohibit 
persons from serving as principal officers or directors. For the details see http://www.sec. 
gov/news/press/2003-89a.htm; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-89a.htm 
 86 In order to enhance the transparency of the work of audit companies Section 101 
created a new administrative body, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. One 
of the main areas of the work of this body is to register audit firms, because after the 
adoption of the act only publicly registered audit firms can provide audit services. Besides 
this authorization function it has the competence to adopt standards, as for instance auditing, 
quality control and ethics which should be respected by all registered companies. More-
over, this organ has a certain supervisory function because it can conduct inspections as 
well as investigations and disciplinary proceedings regarding public accounting firms, and 
it can even impose appropriate sanctions. Lunt: op. cit. 254. 
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2.3.1. Arguments of justification 
The main justification behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the intention to 
defend the American capital markets and, in a broader sense, to protect the 
whole American free enterprise system. On the one hand President George W. 
Bush argued that this act provides “new tools” for the U.S. administration.87 
And, these “new tools” make the American authorities able to defend the 
American free enterprise system against corruption and crime, even in an 
“aggressive” way.88 On the other hand, Senator Paul Sarbanes emphasized that 
the act is an essential piece of legislation in order to protect the investors’ 
confidence in the U.S. corporate structures. Senator Sarbanes pointed out that 
the trust “in corporate executives and their financial reports” as well as the 
independence of accountants should be regarded as the main aims of the act.89 
Consequently, the act is justified in the eye of the U.S. government by the aim 
of protecting the American system of capitalism through the defense of trust 
and confidence in the U.S. corporate structures. This governmental intent to 
restore the confidence can effectively contribute to the smooth functioning of 
U.S. capital markets, which can also be considered to be of vital importance to 
U.S. style capitalism. 
 Another argument for the justification of the act, on a scholarly level, is 
that it can potentially establish “global best practices”,90 so to say it can foster 
the existing convergence of corporate models.91 Many experts state that the 
convergence of corporate governance models can lead to a substantial decrease 
of transaction costs of issuers and to an increased comparability of companies. 
Furthermore, it can also facilitate the opportunities of global firms to enter 
foreign public markets, and trade there with their shares.92 In conclusion, the 
convergence of corporate governance models based on worldwide recognized 
“global best practices” can reduce the transaction costs of the functioning of 
enterprises. And this reduction of transaction costs can increase the efficiency 
of world economy which may lead to a better performance of world markets. 
 
  
 87 President George W. Bush’s speech at the time of signing Sarbanes-Oxley, July 30, 
2002. Quoted by Thompson: op. cit. 266. 
 88 Ibid. 
 89 Falencki: op. cit. 1214. 
 90 Cohen, A.–Winter, M.: The Debate Sarbanes-Oxley. Accountancy Age, Sept 4, 2002. 
http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/comment/2038648/debate-sarbanes-oxley 
 91 Vancea: op. cit. 867–870. 
 92 Cf. Ibid. 868. Footnote 169. At this point the author quotes the researches of John C. 
Coffee. 
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2.3.2. “Insider” and foreign criticisms  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been under very severe criticism since its enactment 
in July 2002. Regarding these critics, one interesting, probably unusual point is 
that the act was criticized by U.S. issuers as well as foreign actors. 
 Smaller U.S. firms were quite vocal concerning the negative effects of the 
act on their businesses. Several advisory organizations came up with such 
conclusions that the burden created by the provisions of the act is quite 
significant for small companies being publicly listed. They also anticipated 
that for these small companies it is even advantageous to go private, that is to 
de-list from the stock exchanges, because they can avoid a considerable 
increase of their costs in this way. As for instance, a survey realized in 2004 
found that for smaller companies, that is firms with annual revenues less than 
$1 billion, the price to remain listed increased by 130 percent compared to the 
costs of the last pre-Sarbanes-Oxley year.93  
 Besides this increasing of compliance costs small firms can be threatened 
by a silent change in the attitude of audit firms invoked by the act. Due to the 
severity of the new rules regarding the auditors, audit companies, mostly the 
Big Four, may drop their clients considered to be too risky to work with them. 
Because of the fact that a Big Four audit is regarded by the business community 
as symbol of prosperity, losing this relation can send a bad message to possible 
investors. Furthermore, the increase in audit fees due to the act’s audit provisions 
may also imply disadvantageous consequences for the smaller companies.94 
 The universal foreign criticism has basically been focused on the charge of 
illegitimate extraterritoriality of the act.95 Generally, the international com-
munity complained that the U.S. intended to act as a global regulator on the 
field of corporate governance practices, thus it did not respect, or even infringed 
the sovereignty of other countries to rule these activities.96 Consequently, the act 
appeared to conflict with classical principles of public international law on 
jurisdiction. Additionally, international business community raised a very clear-
cut point regarding the act’s disadvantageous implications. In the view of 
foreign firms it has a very strong anti-competitive aspect vis-à-vis foreign 
companies.97 They argued that the cost of compliance for foreign companies is 
  
 93 Stoltenberg–Lacey–George–Cuthbert: op. cit. 469. Footnote 72: first and second 
sections. 
 94 Ibid. Footnote: 72 third section. 
 95 Cf. Vagts, D. F.: Extraterritoriality and Corporate Governance Law. The American 
Journal of International Law 97 (2003) 293. 
 96 Falencki: op. cit. 1218. 
 97 Ibid. 
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much higher,98 errors, and therefore criminal penalties are much more likely, 
and some exceptions of the act favor U.S. companies.99 Additionally, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Japan asserted that Congress failed to respect the 
principles of comity, which obliges the U.S. to adjust to those foreign regulations 
which are equivalent to the provisions of the act.100  
 The European Commission, either as a body or through its high officials, 
also indicated quite serious concerns about the act. In a communication of 
2003 the EU Commission raised the problem of “outreach effects” on European 
companies as well as auditors and asserted that these can cause “a series of 
problems”.101 Moreover, Alexander Schaub, Director General of DG Internal 
Market in his speech in the framework of an ECB Symposium criticized the 
act owing to the lack of consultation and the rather fast and hasty process in 
which it was enacted.102  
 Moreover, certain European companies explicitly declared that they have 
very serious doubts whether it is worthwhile to maintain their listing in New 
York. The increased costs of compliance to the new requirements may 
outweigh the benefits of being listed on the New York Stock Exchange.103 
Moreover, almost two thirds of European CEOs said during a survey in 2003 
that they are more reluctant concerning the access to U.S. capital markets then 
they have been prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. These European CEOs argued 
that the over-regulation created by the act could be the biggest threat to the 
business.104 As an illustration of this wide-spread attitude among European 
  
 98 Lunt: op. cit. 264. About compliance costs in details see: Thompson: op. cit. 265. 
Footnote 1. Concerning S&P 500 companies the average costs of auditing fees in 2001 (the 
last prior-Sarbanes-Oxley year) was $2.934.000, following the adoption of the act in 2002 
it increased to an average of $4.048.000. 
 99 Section 402 generally prohibits all loans to executives, but it provides certain 
exceptions for U.S. banks, on the basis that they are insured by a federal entity, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Falencki: op. cit. 1218. 
 100 Ibid. 1211; for a detailed analysis of conflicting rules see Falencki: op. cit. 1225–
1229. 
 101 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU–A Plan to 
Move Forward, COM (2003) 284, 2004 OJ (C 80) 12–16, quoted by Stoltenberg–Lacey–
George–Cuthbert: op. cit. 468. 
 102 Speech by Alexander Schaub, Director General of DG Internal Markets to the ECB 
Symposium, Money v. Ethics, Nov 29, 2002, quoted ibid. 
 103 Ibid. 470. 
 104 Schlesinger, L.: Sarbanes-Oxley scares off European CEOs. Accountancy Age, 24 
Jan, 2003. http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2031960/sarbanes-
oxley-scares-european-ceos 
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CEOs, Wendelin Wiedeking, Porches’s CEO argued, when his company with-
drew its plans for listing on the NYSE, that the certification requirement for 
CEOs and CFOs makes no sense, because German company law establishes a 
collective responsibility for the management board.105  
 
2.3.3. Scholarly problems 
The other part of criticism was raised by scholars and experts. A major part of 
this wave of criticism focused on the issue that the act is, in reality, an 
unambiguous exportation of U.S. corporate governance models. Some scholars 
even asserted that since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was adopted without any 
foreign consultation, in a unilateral way,106 it can be a kind of American economic 
imperialism.107 Thus, from the aspect of international business environment 
including multinational companies as well as major powers of world trade, 
the act may indicate the intent of the U.S. to export its corporate governance 
model without taking into account other interests and divergent models. 
 From a more detailed perspective it can also be argued that the Sarbanes-
Oxley is not in conformity with those requirements which can justify its 
extraterritorial scope. According to an academic position neither the subject-
matter test nor the effects test can justify the extraterritoriality of the act.108 
Due to the fact that that the act does not use any geographical terms and that 
the act’s legislative history suggests that the act is mainly concerned with 
domestic problems, the Congress’ intent to regulate extraterritorial affairs 
cannot be presumed.109 Additionally, since the act also tries to regulate that 
kind of conduct which cannot have substantial harmful effects on U.S. 
investors, because these conducts have already been effectively regulated by 
foreign legal systems, the act goes beyond those considerations which may 
justify extraterritoriality under the effects test.110 Additionally, it should also be 
taken into account that from the perspective of a comity analysis, even in the 
narrow sense of cases of true conflicts between U.S. and foreign laws, as 
accepted in the Hartford Fire111 judgment, the legitimate extraterritoriality of 
the act is highly questionable.112 
  
 105 Lunt: op. cit. 264. 
 106 Stoltenberg–Lacey–George–Cuthbert: op. cit. 457; Vancea: op. cit. 874; Lunt: op. 
cit. 266. 
 107 Falencki: op. cit. 1224. 
 108 Vancea: op. cit. 849–860. 
 109 Ibid. 853–854. 
 110 Ibid. 858. 
 111 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 112 Vancea: op. cit. 861. 
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 Case-studies based on the post-Sarbanes-Oxley experiences revealed the 
fact that certain provisions of the act conflict with some structural elements of 
U.S. or foreign legal systems. Section 307, for instance, requires an attorney 
representing an issuer to report any evidence of a material violation of securities 
law to the chief legal officer or to higher forums, as the Audit Committee or 
the Board of Directors. This provision obviously conflicts with the American 
Bar Association’s model rules of professional conduct which require the 
attorney not to disclose any information without her/his client’s permission. 
The narrow exceptions provided by these model rules, preventing the client 
from committing a criminal act which likely result in imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm, can obviously not be applied to this case.113  
 Some whistleblower protection provisions can also be in conflict with 
national legal systems. In order to get all relevant information related to the 
work of the whole company; companies should establish anonymous tip-lines 
through which an employee can inform the management of the company 
without giving any personal information.114 However, these tip-lines are not 
in conformity with the data-protection rules applied in the EU. In France in 
the case of McDonalds the French Data Protection Authority found that 
McDonalds by introducing an anonymous tip line failed to comply with the 
French Data Protection provision, hence it did not authorize this tip-line 
system.115 A German Court also established that a similar tip-line created by 
the Wal-Mart Group is contrary to the provisions of the German Works 
Constitution Act.116 
 
2.4. General Assessment 
 
The most general and most important effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the 
significantly stronger U.S. governmental position in the supervision of financial 
markets and their operations.117 The act established a new administrative 
body, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and broadened the 
competences of SEC by mandating it with the implementation of the act. So, 
one can easily recognize a shift in the attitude of the U.S. legislator. By this act 
the legislator abandoned the former regulation model based on the self-
  
 113 Thompson: op. cit. 268. 
 114 Ibid. 269–270. 
 115 Ibid. 271–274. 
 116 Ibid. 274–277. 
 117 Ehrat, F. R.: Sarbanes-Oxley–a View from Outside. International Business Lawyer, 
April 2003. 77. 
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regulation mechanisms established and managed by market-participants, and 
proceeded to a novel model in which state supervision has the preeminent 
role.118 It may also indicate that the U.S. legislator recognized the relevance of 
the enhanced governmental regulation of financial markets in order to tame 
those turbulences which might be caused by the market actors’ conduct. 
 Taking into account the importance of U.S. capital markets on the world 
scene it seems to be quite likely that the act shall have a certain benchmark 
effect.119 Foreign legislators may regard the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a reference 
point or a model having certain provisions which might be worthwhile to take 
into consideration during the drafting of new corporate governance standards. 
For instance, during the discussion of 8th Company Law Directive on statutory 
audit Commissioner McCreevy suggested very similar points on the further 
development of EC law in this area.120 Inter alia he emphasized that the 
directive should clarify the duties of auditors, their independence and their ethics. 
Moreover he argued for a “robust public oversight of the audit profession”.121  
 The recent version of this directive being in force obliges public-interest 
entities to establish an audit committee which should primarily monitor the 
financial reporting process and the effectiveness of the company internal audit 
and risk management system.122 It is not too difficult to identify the same 
underlying philosophy behind the above-cited article of the EC directive and 
the relevant paragraphs of Sarbanes Oxley Act on audit committees. Both the 
U.S. and the EC legislator attempts to strengthen the independence of audit 
mechanisms by establishing a new committee within the traditional corporate 
structures in order to minimize the risks arising from the possible interlocking 
of companies and audit firms.  
 In conclusion, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not only profoundly changed 
the regulative framework of U.S. financial markets by setting forth new 
standards for publicly listed companies, but revealed a new tendency of U.S. 
legislation which proceeds to an increased governmental intervention in former 
self-regulatory areas. Additionally, the act can also illustrate another change 
in the U.S. legislator’s approach concerning extraterritoriality; instead of the 
  
 118 Ibid.  
 119 Ibid. 
 120 Naturally, the effects of Parmalat collapse in 2003 should also taken into account as 
a significant motivation to adopt an ammended version of the former directives on audit 
controls. Cf. Stoltenberg–Lacey–George–Cuthberg: op. cit. 478–481. 
 121 Ibid. 482. 
 122 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 
2006, Art 41. 
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former international practice focusing on the search for cooperative solutions 
to extraterritorial problems, the U.S. legislator privileges the unilateral solution 
nowadays. 
 
 
III. Sovereignty in the mirror of the recent extraterritorial developments 
 
1. Introductory remarks 
 
Sovereignty is one of the most important basic antinomies in the understanding 
of modern international law. Its precise meaning, boundaries and relevance has 
been broadly debated in our age, however these very intense scholarly disputes 
indicate its inestimable importance within the structure of international law.123 
Extensive debates on sovereignty, from the most different perspectives, are 
quite frequent, but a theory of international law without sovereignty, at least 
as an antithesis, is nearly unimaginable. Hence, it is a rational solution to 
compare the earlier findings with certain dimensions of sovereignty, since it 
may facilitate to better understand both our findings and sovereignty in 
itself.124 
 In the next part the paper will reflect the earlier findings to the concept of 
sovereignty by using three different prisms. Each prism–Legislatio, Legitimatio 
and Subordinatio–will highlight a peculiar feature of sovereignty to compare 
this feature to recent extraterritorial developments. This method may make 
possible to better comprehend the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the general 
concept of sovereignty and formulate some conclusions. 
 
2. Legislatio–sovereignty as legislation 
 
Those international lawyers who rely on the heritage of Jean Bodin agree that 
legislation is the most crucial aspects of sovereignty.125 By the ‘invention’ of 
sovereignty Bodin created the modern state’s most relevant conceptual basis. 
  
 123 Cf. Jennings, Sir R.: Sovereignty and International Law. In: Kreijen, G. (ed.): State, 
Sovereignty and International Governance. Oxford, 2002. 27. 
 124 Due to the differences in the interpretation of this concept, this paper does not 
endeavor to work out a comprehensive definition. In the following analysis it will only 
apply certain dimensions of sovereignty, which should be a part of it, however they should 
not be every part. 
 125 Cf. Jennings: op. cit. 30–31. Sir Jennings here argues that these years’ tragic 
situations related to ‘failed states’ in Asia and Africa are obvious symptoms of the decline 
of state sovereignty.  
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If the modern state is sovereign all governmental functions, so to say the 
corollaries of statehood like legislation, execution and judiciary, are easily 
explainable coherently from the point of view of public law. Since every state 
competence emanates from a final axiom, from the suprema potestas. And 
one particularly relevant dimensions of sovereignty is legislation, as Bodin 
formulated it: an essential manifestation of sovereignty is the power to make 
the law.126 Or, in a more modern wording: a state’s sovereign right to regulate127 
those conducts which are under its jurisdiction, if certain requirements regarding 
the basis for it are met. 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a sovereign legislative act in an age when most 
scholars talk about the disappearance or the erosion of traditional sovereignty 
presuming a governmental center of decision-making.128 They argue mostly 
following these three patterns. First, in our world classical state sovereignty is 
diminishing since the interlocked nature of world economy and its economic 
self-regulation regimes make it meaningless.129 Hence state sovereignty is a 
possible source of binding norms, but neither the only one, nor a privileged 
one. Secondly, besides the classic governmental level alternative, that is from 
sub-national units to supra-national or global processes, decision-making centers 
have been emerging since the end of Cold War.130 Therefore, more and more 
parts of decisions are made on a level, or in a process which is not the traditional 
governmental one. And thirdly, due to the considerable improvement of 
regulatory elements in international law, such as for instance human rights 
enforcement mechanisms, international law erodes governments’ sovereignty 
  
 126 “Primum ac praecipium caput majestatis […] legem universis ac singulis civibus 
dare posse” quoted by Ibid. 27. 
 127 A. W. Lowe argues that economic sovereignty, as a theoretical concept, may help in 
deciding jurisdictional conflicts by summarizing those points–a central core of economic 
rights–which can justify the extraterritorial reach of a given act. Cf. Lowe, A. W.: The 
Problems of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Economic Sovereignty and the Search for a 
Solution. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 34  (1985) 744–746. 
 128 For a comprehensive overview from the point of view of international relations see: 
Jennings: op. cit. 33–35. 
 129 Cf. Teubner, G.: Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society. In:  
Teubner, G. (ed.): Global Law Without a State. Aldershot-Brookfield USA-Singapore-
Sydney, 1997. 4–7. 
 130 Cf. Brühl, T.–Rittberger, V.: From International to Global Governance: Actors, 
Collective Decision-Making, and the United Nations in the World of Twenty-first 
Century. In: Rittberger, V. (ed.): Global Governance and the United Nations System. 
Tokyo, 2002. 1–6. 
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to comprehensively regulate domestic affairs.131 That being said, governments 
should incorporate norms having an international or supranational law origin 
into their legal systems without possessing any discretion for their implemen-
tation. 
 Notwithstanding this, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggests a slightly differ-
entiated conclusion about the imaginable future of sovereignty. Through 
classical lenses this act is the best example of a traditional sovereign legislative 
act. When Congress passed the act, it made a serious effort to change the 
whole framework of such a regulatory area–law of securities and corporate 
governance–which has a strategic importance from the perspective of the 
whole U.S. economy in the age of globalization. Thus, this ‘draconian’ change 
in the law of securities is in the very national interest of the U.S. In doing so, 
the legislator was quite reluctant to take into account the legitimate interests of 
other states or those of the international community, in one word comity 
concerns. So, the act had been passed in a unilateral way, which was shocking 
as a new state practice regarding the cooperative solution of extraterritorial 
issues seemed to be gradually emerging at the end of the 90’s.132 But, the U.S. 
legislator simply disregarded this former practice and enacted the act without 
any serious doubts in its legality concerning all international law aspects. 
Furthermore, the SEC, being responsible for its implementation, has also 
been very reluctant to consider foreign complaints, although it provided some 
extension of compliance deadlines, it did not permit any exemptions from the 
scope of the act for foreign companies.133 
 In conclusion, the example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act unambiguously shows 
that notwithstanding all those considerations and achievements which may 
suggest the rethinking of the classic theories of public international law largely 
  
 131 Cf. Weiler, J. H. H.: The Geology of International Law–Governance, Democracy 
and Legitimacy. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 64 (2004) 
559. 
 132 All examples of this emerging practice in antitrust cases–Agreement relating to 
Mutual Co-operation regarding Restrictive Business Practices of 1976 (USA-Germany), 
Agreement relating to Co-operation on Antitrust Matters of 1982 (USA-Australia), the 
final outcome of the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merger, and the Transatlantic 
Partnership on Political Cooperation and Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for 
Strengthening of Investment Protection in 1998 about the effects of the Helms-Burton and 
D’Amato Acts between the United States and the European Union–showed that the parties 
concerned can find cooperative solutions. 
 133 This is contrary to the former SEC practice, which exempted foreign companies 
from certain obligations flowing from the securities acts. For a more detailed discussion 
see Falencki: op. cit. 1229–1231. and Lunt: op. cit. 250. 
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based on sovereignty, sovereignty as a right to legislation is still in force and 
can be a powerful tool in the hands of governments. And, governments by using 
this tool can seriously disturb the recent structure of international law by 
creating such a situation which is obviously contrary to the universally 
recognized principles of international law. However, this attitude is such a 
reality which renders the adjustment of both international and national policies 
necessary. 
 
3. Legitimatio–sovereignty as a value-basis in the construction of 
 international law 
 
From the second half of the 19th century to the first decade of the 20th century, 
transactionalism was the dominant assumption in the theory of international 
law. This approach was mostly based on such interlinking concepts as sovereign 
equality, consent and pacta sunt servanda.134 It also meant that the basic 
legitimating source of the whole international order based on an international 
law mostly comprised of bilateral treaties was the sovereign will of actors. So, 
behind the whole system of international law stood the states’ sovereign will as 
a fundamental cornerstone of the entire world order. Therefore, from this 
perspective, Sovereignty, that is to say sovereign equality, could be regarded 
as the preeminent legitimating source of international law. 
 However, following the end of World War I and owing to the hard lessons 
stemming from it the value structure of the international system has begun to 
gradually change. First of all, Stability as a value has appeared. It primarily 
meant that the maintenance of the stability of the international system with the 
help of a multilateral framework should be considered as a value of humankind. 
This conviction was reflected among the objectives of the League of Nations 
in an embryonic form,135 and considerably elaborated in the UN Charter.136 
Then, Human Rights have also become a legitimating factor of international 
law as they were concretized in the UN human rights system, from a solemn 
declaration through covenants to implementing and follow-up mechanisms.137 
Moreover, international Rule-of-Law, meaning the slow formation of increasingly 
  
 134 Cf. Weiler: op. cit. 555. 
 135 Preamble, Art 8 first para, Art 10, Art 11. The Covenant of the League of Nations. 
 136 Art 1. UN Charter.  
 137 de Wet, E.: The International Constitutional Order. International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 55 (2006) 58. 
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refined and complex international dispute settlements systems,138 also got quite 
an important place within the values of the international community. 
 Thus, the value-basis of international law is much richer and broader today 
than it was at the turn of the 20th century, when Sovereignty had a predominant 
place in this construction. Therefore, legitimization of international law emanates 
from these values which can even permit the restriction of Sovereignty in order 
to favor other values. 
 The legislative attitude behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is exclusively based 
on the sovereignty of Congress. Within certain constitutional limits139 Congress  
can regulate anything, even conducts occurring outside the territory of the U.S., 
and it is only legitimated by Sovereignty. It is not too difficult to recognize that 
this approach has clearly originated from that century when Sovereignty, and 
the national interest implied within it, was the predominant legitimating factor 
in international law. So, as the example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act shows it, 
this classic attitude did not at all disappear under the influence of the new 
values, it can again-and-again appear if a certain constellation of facts invokes it.  
 What could be the major factors being able to trigger this attitude? On the 
basis of lessons arising from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act one of them is clearly 
identifiable. If basic or vital interests of a state are at stake, it is quite likely 
that the given government will answer by bringing out the mask of Sovereignty. 
And, if this state has enough power,140 in military, economic and diplomatic 
sense, to disregard or neglect the reactions of the international community, 
such an answer will be even more likely.  
4. Subordinatio–sovereignty with the eyes of subjects 
  
 138 For a comprehensive overview of the web of international, regional and specialized 
tribunals as well as international administrative tribunals and international arbitral tribunals 
see: Burgenthal, T.: Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad. 
Leiden Journal of International Law 14 (2001) 267–271. 
 139 Concerning extraterritoriality the Congress is limited by the so-called “subject-
matter” test which comprised of two mutually interlinked assumptions. The first one is the 
“Charming Betsy presumption” implying that legislative acts cannot to be enacted in 
violation of international law. The second one, the Foley Bros. presumption, asserts that an 
act of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, can be applied within U.S. territorial 
jurisdiction. The intent of Congress, if it is not an explicit one, can be revealed from the 
given act’s legislative history and the related administrative decisions. This doctrine was 
revitalized by the Aramco judgment in 1991. Cf. Vancea: op. cit. 849–852. 
 140 Cf. Rynagaert, C.: The Limits of Substantive International Economic Law: In 
Support of Reasonable Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. KULeuven Institute for International 
Law Working Papers, No. 99, Aug. 2006. at http://law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/ 
WP99e.pdf, 2. 4th para. and 5. 3rd para. 
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From a different angle, sovereignty necessarily implies the fact of subordina-
tion to the suprema potestas. All subjects under the scope of the sovereign must 
obey to its acts so long as the conditions for a legitimate practice of sovereign 
powers are satisfied. In modern international law this conviction is reflected 
in the very refined doctrine of jurisdiction as well as in the detailed rules of 
conflicts-of-laws. Thus, doctrine of jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws rules 
orientate that fundamental preparatory process in international law whereby a 
person is subjected to a given legal system which emanates from the will of a 
sovereign. Therefore, these areas of law, which may have a marginal significance 
compared to the weight of substantive provisions, have a vital importance 
regarding the element of subordinatio in international law. So, state practice 
concerning the extraterritorial reach of a sovereign act can have fundamental 
importance from the point of view of potential subjects. 
 In accordance with the provisions of the act every issuer is under the scope 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act if its securities are registered on the U.S. financial 
markets or it has to report regularly to the SEC. In order to get a slightly more 
precise picture on the relevance of this section it is worthwhile comparing the 
list of top 200 transnational companies with the list of registered companies on 
the U.S. securities exchanges.141 In 1999, so during the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
period, from the top 30 transnational companies 21 companies were foreign 
in accordance with their place of incorporation and the remaining 9 were 
incorporated in the USA. From the foreign multinational companies only 7 
companies were not registered under the SEC (4 Japanese and 3 German multi-
nationals). This fact means that the most powerful players of world economy 
attach a substantial importance, due to a number of reasons as for instance 
access to nearly unlimited sources of capital or indicating the prosperity by 
being registered on such prestigious marketplaces, to the fact of being registered 
on U.S. capital markets. So, a considerable majority of top global multinational 
companies142 is an actor on the U.S. securities markets, that is to say they have 
to act under the scope of U.S. securities law even if they are de facto foreign 
companies. Nevertheless, until the birth of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the SEC 
  
 141 Cf. S. Anderson and J. Cavanagh: Top 200–The Rise of Corporate Global Power. 
at http://www.ips-dc.org/downloads/Top_200.pdf 10. Table 3. Top 200 (1999); and 
International Registered and Reporting Companies, Alphabethical Listing (2000) at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/alpha2000.htm  
 142 About multinational or transnational companies in general see: Wallace: op. cit. 9–
13 and 60–70. 
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provided them some exception from those obligations which must be completely 
fulfilled by domestic companies. 
 With the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Congress in fact tried to fully 
subject all registered companies to its jurisdiction notwithstanding their place 
of origin or registration. So, the U.S. Sovereign sent a clear message to the 
major actors of the global economy: if they want to have access to the U.S. 
capital market they have to fully comply with the requirements of the act, even 
if this extraterritorial reach is contrary to international law and the former 
international practice, or the compliance costs are too high. Foreign multi-
nationals can only stay on the domestic capital markets if they accept these 
new rules emanating from the will of sovereign. In any other case, due to 
whatever legitimate reason of non-compliance, transnational companies must 
leave the U.S. securities exchanges because exemption from the scope of the 
act is impossible.  
 In conclusion, if transnational companies would like to participate in the 
exploitation of U.S. capital sources, they have to subject their full corporate 
governance system to the new rules created by the Sovereign. So, Congress 
offered them a stay or leave solution via neglecting the classical mechanisms 
to deal with the problem of subordinatio developed by scholars and state 
practice in the last century. This attitude revealed again, in a very bluntly way, 
the element of subordinatio in sovereignty which was successfully disguised 
and tamed by the doctrine of jurisdiction and international private law. 
 
5. Final comments 
 
The comparison of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to these three profoundly interlocked 
dimensions of sovereignty–Legislatio, Legitimatio and Subordinatio–can lead 
us toward a slightly non-conventional conclusion. First of all, it should be 
recognized that the whole concept of sovereignty is under transformation. The 
concept of sovereignty is changing since states are more-and-more willing to 
give up or confer certain competences to international organizations. More-
over, the international, perhaps it is better-to-say global context of international 
law has also considerably changed, and this transformation also eroded some 
original aspects of sovereignty mostly in an economic sense.  
 However, as the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act unambiguously shows, 
this does not at all mean that sovereignty is completely disappearing, rather 
that its function has been transforming to a certain degree. Nowadays, in 
accordance with the emblematic example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, legislative 
sovereignty–legitimated by the sovereign interest and the goal of subjecting 
certain actors to the sovereign regulative competences in order to protect vital 
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national interests–might be conceived of as an ultima ratio, a last legal basis 
which can be very efficiently invoked.  
 In conclusion, it is quite plausible to say that the classical 19th century 
approach of sovereignty is outdated, but sovereignty is still in play if the 
question is the protection of fundamental national interests. One may formulate 
this conclusion from a different angle, too: under the layers of global inter-
dependence, multilateralism, regionalism and international regulatory processes–
that is to say under the surface of those factors of which our age’s international 
environment is comprised–we can get to see Sovereignty if a certain constella-
tion of facts invoke its re-appearance. And, it has exactly happened in the case 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
